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TEXAS V. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE 
POLITICAL-QUESTION DOCTRINE 
Scott Dodson* 
In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Texas sued four other 
states in an original action in the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that those 
states violated, among other constitutional provisions, the Electors Clause. 
One issue the Supreme Court did not reach in the case—and has never 
reached before—was the impact of the political-question doctrine on claims 
under the Electors Clause. This short essay takes up that issue. Analyzing 
the applicability of the political-question doctrine to the Electors Clause, I 
conclude that the political-question doctrine operates as only a narrow 
constraint on Electors Clause claims. Applying those principles, I conclude 
that Texas’s claims were not barred by the political-question doctrine, 
though portions of the relief Texas sought may have been. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in which Joe Biden defeated 
Donald Trump, lawsuits proliferated.1 The most prominent was a lawsuit by the 
state of Texas, which had certified Trump as the winner of its electoral votes, 
against four Defendant States—Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Geor-
gia, all of which certified Biden as the winner of their electoral vote—in an orig-
inal action in the U.S. Supreme Court.2 Texas alleged, among other claims, that 
those states’ election conduct violated the Electors Clause of U.S. Constitution.3 
The Supreme Court summarily denied Texas’s motion for leave to file its 
action “for lack of standing under Article III”4 but that standing defect simply 
denied Texas the ability to bring the Electors Clause challenge. Different 
 
 *  James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, and 
Director of the Center for Litigation and Courts, UC Hastings Law. 
 1.  Jacob Shamsian & Sonam Sheth, Trump and His Allies Filed More than 40 Lawsuits Challenging the 
2020 Election Results. All of Them Failed., BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/trump-campaign-lawsuits-election-results-2020-11 [https://perma.cc/F3HG-GERH]. 
 2. Bill of Complaint, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155, 2020 WL 7296814 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020). 
 3. The Bill of Complaint also asserted claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
 4. Justices Alito and Thomas would have allowed the Bill of Complaint on grounds that the Court’s 
original jurisdiction is nondiscretionary but would not have granted other relief. Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155, 
2020 WL 7296814, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020). The Court also dismissed all other motions filed in the case as 
moot. Id. 
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plaintiffs might have had standing to bring an Electors Clause challenge in fed-
eral court.5 Further, because states need not conform to the standing requirements 
of Article III, a range of potential plaintiffs could bring such a challenge in state 
court. 
Clearing the standing hurdle would present a new hurdle: the political-
question doctrine. That doctrine deems inappropriate for judicial resolution cer-
tain questions that, instead, should be resolved by the political branches. Does 
the political-question doctrine deny courts the ability to resolve claims under the 
Electors Clause? Relying on the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,6 Texas argued 
no, but the question has not been answered by courts or commentators, and the 
Supreme Court, in rejecting Texas’s suit, did not reach the issue. 
This short essay interrogates the issue of whether Electors Clause chal-
lenges raise nonjusticiable political questions. The analysis is far more compli-
cated than Texas made out, but Texas’s answer was basically correct. The polit-
ical-question doctrine does not prevent courts from hearing and adjudicating a 
variety of Electors Clause challenges, including the challenges advanced in 
Texas v. Pennsylvania. The doctrine, however, does prevent both state and fed-
eral courts from using their remedial powers to appoint a state’s electors in a 
manner contrary to the state legislature’s directives.7 Thus, some of Texas’s own 
proposed remedies would have violated the political-question doctrine.  
II.  TEXAS’S CLAIMS 
The Electors Clause provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Man-
ner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”8 Texas argued 
that the Defendant States’ judiciaries and executive officials acted in ways con-
trary to how their legislatures directed the appointment of their electors.9 
For example, Texas asserted that Pennsylvania’s Secretary of State, Kathy 
Boockvar “unilaterally abrogated several Pennsylvania statutes requiring signa-
ture verification for absentee or mail-in ballots” when she settled a lawsuit chal-
lenging those provisions and issued “revised guidance” stating Pennsylvania law 
 
 5. The state legislatures would likely have standing to bring Electors Clause challenges. See Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 793 (2015) (holding that a state legislature had 
standing to assert an Elections Clause challenge); Bognet v. Secretary, 980 F.3d 336, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(suggesting that the legislature would have standing to assert an Electors Clause claim). In addition, some, but 
not all, courts have held the losing candidate and the losing-party electors would have standing. Compare Trump 
v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, F. Supp. 3d (E.D. Wis. 2020) (holding Trump to have standing), and Carson v. Simon, 
978 F.3d 1051, 1057–59 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that losing-party electors had standing), with 
Bognet, 980 F.3d at 349–52 (holding that the losing congressional candidate did not have standing to bring Elec-
tors Clause challenges), and Bowyer v. Ducey, No. CV-20-02321-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL 7238261 (D. Ariz. Dec. 
9, 2020) (holding that losing-party electors did not have standing). 
 6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 7.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Bill of Complaint, supra note 2, at 4 (“State officials . . . announced new rules for the conduct of the 
2020 election that were inconsistent with existing state statutes defining what constitutes a lawful vote.”); id. ¶ 
13 (“By purporting to waive or otherwise modify the existing state law in a manner that was wholly ultra vires 
and not adopted by each state’s legislature, Defendant States violated . . . the Electors Clause.”). 
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did not “authorize the county board of elections to set aside returned absentee or 
mail-in ballots based solely on signature analysis by the county board of elec-
tions.”10 Texas also contended that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, based 
on the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Free Elections Clause,11 extended the statu-
tory deadline for timely ballots. Texas made similar allegations that state execu-
tive officials and judges in Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin issued rules and 
rulings contrary to their respective state statutory provisions governing elec-
tions.12 
Texas argued that because these actions of state officials were contrary to 
legislative directives, and thus violations of the Electors Clause, electors ap-
pointed as a result of the violations “cannot cast constitutionally valid votes for 
the office of President.”13 
Texas sought declarations that the Defendant States “administered the 2020 
presidential election in violation of the Electors Clause” and that “any electoral 
college votes cast by such presidential electors appointed in Defendant States . . . 
are in violation of the Electors Clause . . . and cannot be counted.”14 Texas also 
sought an order 
• “[e]njoin[ing]” the Defendants States from “[using] the 2020 election 
results for the Office of President to appoint presidential electors to the 
Electoral College,” 
• “authoriz[ing], pursuant to the Court’s remedial authority, the Defendant 
States to conduct a special election to appoint presidential electors,” 
• “direct[ing] such States’ legislatures . . . to appoint a new set of presi-
dential electors in a manner that does not violate the Electors Clause 
. . . or to appoint no presidential electors at all,” and 
• “[e]njoin[ing] the Defendant States from certifying presidential elec-
tors.”15 
Anticipating objections to its Electors Clause claims on political-question 
grounds, Texas filed a brief arguing that the political-question doctrine did not 
bar its claims. That brief, however, commits barely 150 words to addressing the 
political-question doctrine. Texas argued, in full: 
The “political questions doctrine” does not apply here. Under that doctrine, 
federal courts will decline to review issues that the Constitution delegates 
to one of the other branches—the “political branches”—of government. 
While picking electors involves political rights, the Supreme Court has 
ruled in a line of cases beginning with Baker that constitutional claims re-
lated to voting (other than claims brought under the Guaranty Clause) are 
justiciable in the federal courts. As the Court held in Baker [v. Carr], liti-
gation over political rights is not the same as a political question:  
 
 10. Id. at 14–15. 
 11. PA. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020). 
 12. Bill of Complaint, supra note 2, at 20–22 (Georgia); id. at 24–27 (Michigan); id. at 30–35 (Wisconsin). 
 13. Id. at 37. 
 14. Id. at 39. 
 15. Id. at 40. 
DODSON_IMPORT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/21  5:42 PM 
144 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 2021 
We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable 
“political question.” The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a polit-
ical right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection 
“is little more than a play upon words.” 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. This is no political question; it is a constitutional 
one that this Court should answer.16 
Texas’s argument is woefully insufficient. While it is true political rights 
do not necessarily give rise to a political question, they can give rise to political 
questions, and it is untrue that “constitutional claims related to voting (other than 
claims brought under the Guaranty Clause) are justiciable.”17 In Rucho v. Com-
mon Cause, a blockbuster decision from 2019 written by Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, the Court held that Elections Clause, First Amendment, and Equal Protec-
tion Clause challenges to excessively partisan-gerrymandered voting districts 
presented nonjusticiable political questions.18 It appears that Texas was not bank-
ing on Roberts’s vote. 
Texas instead should have confronted the two well-established guideposts 
for the political-question doctrine. Does the Constitution assign the question to a 
branch other than the federal courts?19 And does answering the question involve 
the application of standards that are not judicially discoverable and managea-
ble?20 Those are more difficult analyses whose resolutions go well beyond a ge-
neric citation to Baker v. Carr.21 I take up those analyses next. 
III.  THE ELECTORS CLAUSE AND THE POLITICAL-QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The Electors Clause instructs states to appoint electors in the manner di-
rected by the state legislature.22 This provision assigns to the states the power to 
appoint electors.23 Absent some constitutional delegation of this power by the 
states, federal courts cannot purport to appoint electors themselves. The Electors 
Clause also assigns to the state legislatures the power to prescribe the manner of 
appointment.24 Again, absent some constitutional delegation of this power by the 
state legislatures, federal courts cannot purport to prescribe the manner for ap-
pointing electors. 
This conclusion is strongly supported by Gilligan v. Morgan,25 which in-
volved Due Process Clause challenges to the negligent training of National 
 
 16. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 19–20, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 
155, 2020 WL 7296814 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020). 
 17.  Id. 
 18. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 19. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
 20. Id. 
 21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For a deeper exposition of the political-question doctrine, see Scott Dodson, 
Article III and the Political-Question Doctrine, 116 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 23. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (describing Section 1 of Article II 
as an “express delegation[] of power to the States”). 
 24.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 25. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Guard reservists, and which asked the federal courts to “establish standards for 
the training” of the National Guard.26 The Militia Clause vests in Congress the 
power to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” and 
which vests in the states “the Authority of training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.”27 Based on this language, the Court held that 
the Militia Clause assigns oversight and training functions of the National Guard 
exclusively to nonjudicial decisionmakers, and thus the lawsuit claims requiring 
judicial oversight and training presented nonjusticiable political questions.28 
Analogizing to Gilligan, Electors Clause claims seeking to involve the federal 
courts in the states’ appointment of electors or the state legislatures’ manner of 
appointing electors would similarly involve nonjusticiable political questions. 
It is possible the Electors Clause’s assignments of those powers to the states 
could be delegated by the states to the federal courts. The Constitution expressly 
allows congressional delegation of the power to appoint inferior officers,29 and 
Congress has so delegated this power, including to the federal judiciary.30 Alt-
hough the Constitution contains no express authorization of delegation of Elec-
tors Clause powers, delegation can, under certain circumstances, be implied,31 
and the Court has endorsed the possibility of congressional delegation to the fed-
eral courts of some kinds of political questions otherwise nonjusticiable under 
the Guaranty Clause.32 With respect to the Electors Clause, although some state 
legislatures have delegated Electors Clause responsibilities to state agencies,33 it 
does not appear that any states have delegated Electors Clause authority to the 
federal courts. 
Even with some constitutional delegation, federal courts could only appoint 
electors or prescribe the manner for appointing electors if doing so involves ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards.34 If the task involves political, 
rather than judicial, standards, then the task is “beyond the competence of the 
 
 26. Id. at 4–6. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 28. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1973). 
 29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“But the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
 30. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (delegating the appointment of bankruptcy judges); § 631(a) (delegating the 
appointment of magistrate judges). 
 31. To be fair, the scope of implied delegation is subject to vigorous ongoing debate. See Gundy v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (featuring divergent opinions from the justices about the scope of congressional 
authority to delegate legislative powers). 
 32. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 43 (1849) (stating that Congress “might, if they had deemed it most 
advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which 
required the federal government to interfere”). Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question 
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1969 (2015) (“[C]ourts and commentators in the nineteenth century assumed 
that Congress could transform a ‘political question’ into a ‘judicial question’ by asking courts to decide the is-
sue.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113–14 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“In Florida, . . . the 
legislature has delegated the authority to run the elections and to oversee election disputes to the Secretary of 
State . . . and to state circuit courts.”). 
 34. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2492–94 (2019). 
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federal courts” and outside their authority under Article III.35 The task of ap-
pointing electors or prescribing a manner of appointment, without more guid-
ance, presents only political questions. The Court has interpreted the appoint-
ment power to grant “the broadest power of determination” with a wide range of 
permissible methods.36 Choosing among them involves political, not legal, 
standards. Perhaps a delegation of authority could specify judicially manageable 
standards for implementation, but an unfiltered delegation of Electors Clause 
powers to the federal courts would likely present political questions outside of 
their authority to resolve under Article III. 
For these reasons, based on the Supreme Court’s precedent, the appointing 
of electors and the prescription of the manner for appointing electors are nonjus-
ticiable political questions that federal courts cannot adjudicate. 
These political questions are narrow, however. The Electors Clause does 
not commit all matters involving electors and their selection to the states. If an 
Electors Clause claim involves matters outside the Electors Clause—such as if 
the challenged non-legislative actions do not comprise part of the “manner” of 
appointing electors—a federal court could so declare—and then dismiss the 
claim on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state an Electors Clause 
claim.37  
Even matters within the scope of the Electors Clause but ancillary to the 
Electors Clause’s political questions could be adjudicated by federal courts. In 
particular, federal courts can interpret the scope of the Electors Clause’s assign-
ment of power, as long as the federal courts do not usurp that assigned power for 
themselves. In Chiafalo v. Washington,38 for example, the Supreme Court held, 
on the merits, that a state could include, as part of its appointment of electors, an 
enforceable penalty for an elector’s failure to vote as directed by law.39 The issue 
in Chiafalo was justiciable because it involved an interpretation of the scope of 
the Electors Clause powers rather than the Court performing the task of actually 
appointing electors.40 
Similarly, federal courts can enforce other constitutional provisions that 
impose restrictions on the states’ exercise of Electors Clause authority. In Wil-
liams v. Rhodes,41 for example, the Court confronted an Equal Protection Clause 
challenge to state election laws rendering it “virtually impossible” for presiden-
tial candidates of political parties other than the Democratic Party or the 
 
 35. Id. at 2500 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892). 
 37. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195–96 (2012) (contrasting the potentially nonjusticiable 
question of whether Jerusalem is part of Israel with the justiciable question of whether a congressional statute 
purporting to recognize Jerusalem as a part of Israel unconstitutionally invades the President’s powers). 
 38. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 39. Id. at 2320. 
 40. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (rejecting the political-question doctrine and 
construing the scope of the House of Representative’s power to refuse to seat a member under the Qualifications 
Clause). See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993) (“The decision as to whether a Member 
satisfied these qualifications was placed with the House, but the decision as to what these qualifications consisted 
of was not.”). 
 41. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
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Republican Party “to be placed on the state ballot to choose electors.”42 The state 
defended on the ground that the Electors Clause gives the state unfettered discre-
tion to manage the process of selecting electors43 and asserted that the political-
question doctrine barred the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the claim.44 The 
Supreme Court rejected the application of the political-question doctrine,45 held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion under the Electors 
Clause,46 and found that the state’s election laws violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.47 
Finally, the political-question doctrine does not bar a federal court from 
protecting the state or the state legislature’s prerogatives under the Electors 
Clause from encroachment or usurpation by other actors.48 In Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board,49 for example, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Florida Supreme Court violated the Electors Clause by changing the 
Florida legislature’s manner of appointing electors.50 Although the Court ulti-
mately declined to rule on the merits of that issue, its opinion indicates that the 
Court was prepared to reverse the Florida Supreme Court if the state court had 
unconstitutionally invaded the powers of the Florida legislature under the Elec-
tors Clause.51 
So, in sum, the political-question doctrine prevents a federal court from 
appointing electors and from prescribing the manner for appointing electors. 
Those responsibilities are committed to the state entities assigned in the Consti-
tution absent redelegation. Federal courts retain authority to hear election-law 
cases outside of the Electors Clause, to adjudicate issues regarding the scope of 
state authority under the Electors Clause, to hear claims involving other provi-
sions of the Constitution that are justiciable, and to protect the prerogatives of 
the state assignees under the Electors Clause. 
IV.  APPLYING THE DOCTRINE TO TEXAS V. PENNSYLVANIA 
These principles inform the political-question analysis of the Electors 
Clause claim in Texas v. Pennsylvania and lead to several conclusions about the 
political-question doctrine at issue in the case. 
 
 42. Id. at 24. 
 43. Id. at 26. 
 44. Id. at 28. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 28–29. 
 47. Id. at 34. 
 48. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“If we are to respect the 
legislature’s Article II powers, therefore, we must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the 
legislat[ure].”). 
 49. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
 50. Id. at 73. 
 51. Id. at 76–77. On a subsequent appeal in the same case, three justices joined an opinion finding that the 
Florida Supreme Court had usurped the legislature’s prerogatives under the Electors Clause. See Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. at 116–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (finding that the Florida Supreme Court unconstitutionally 
departed from the legislative scheme). 
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The primary conclusion is that Texas’s liability claim that various non-leg-
islative state actors in the four Defendant States violated the Electors Clause was 
justiciable. Adjudicating that claim would not have required the Supreme Court 
to either appoint electors or prescribe the manner of appointing electors. Rather, 
the claim would have required the Court to construe the scope of the legislative 
authority under the Electors Clause and, if necessary, protect that authority from 
encroachment by non-legislative state actors. All of those tasks are allowed under 
the political-question doctrine. 
That the political-question doctrine would not have barred judicial adjudi-
cation of Texas’s Electors Clause claim does not mean that the Supreme Court 
would have found for Texas on the merits. The Court may very well have rejected 
Texas’s Electors Clause claim because, among other possible reasons, (a) the 
statutes at issue were not part of the “[m]anner” of appointing electors as as-
signed by the Electors Clause or (b) any actions by the non-legislative state actors 
did not amount to unconstitutional usurpation of the legislatures’ prerogatives 
under the Electors Clause.52 
With respect to the latter possibility, two additional issues are worth noting. 
First, the Court previously has suggested that the state legislature’s authority un-
der the Electors Clause is subject to the state constitution.53 Thus, state-court 
invalidations of legislative manners of appointing electors, if invalidated pursu-
ant to the mandates of the state constitution, could be consistent with the Electors 
Clause.54 Second, the legislatures in the Defendant States may have delegated 
some of their Electors Clause authority to non-legislative state actors, including 
those very actors whom Texas accused of usurping legislative authority. If so, 
then their interpretations of the election laws, if done in furtherance of legislative 
intent, may have been consistent with—even required by—the Electors Clause. 
One remaining political-question issue works against Texas. Texas sought 
various remedies. The declaratory relief Texas sought—declarations that the De-
fendant States administered the election in violation of the Electors Clause and 
that any electoral votes cast were in violation of the Electors Clause55—are 
within the authority of the federal courts. But the injunctive relief Texas sought 
is problematic. Texas sought an order enjoining the Defendant States from using 
the election results to appoint electors, authorizing the Defendant States to con-
duct a special election, directing the state legislatures to appoint a new set of 
 
 52. See Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, No. 20-CV-1785-BHL, 2020 WL 7318940, at *12 (E.D. Wis. 
Dec. 12, 2020) (distinguishing between constitutional manner of appointing electors and “mere administration 
of a general election”); id. at *13 (“If ‘Manner’ in the Elections Clause is read to include legislative enactments 
concerning election administration, the term necessarily also encompasses the Wisconsin Legislature’s statutory 
choice to empower the WEC to perform the very roles that plaintiff now condemns.”). 
 53. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (stating that the legislative prerogatives under the 
Electors Clause are cabined by limitations imposed by the state constitutions). Cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 
367 (1932) (holding the legislature’s prerogatives under the Elections Clause are subject to the state constitutional 
requirement of gubernatorial assent). 
 54. That appears to have been the case in Pennsylvania. See Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 
345 (Pa. 2020). 
 55. Bill of Complaint, supra note 2, at 39. 
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electors, and enjoining the states from certifying the electors.56 Each of these 
requests asks the Supreme Court to set standards for the appointment or the man-
ner of appointing electors. It is not clear that the Court could do so consistent 
with the political-question doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This essay has tackled the application of the political-question doctrine to 
the Electors Clause, especially in light of the lawsuit initiated by Texas challeng-
ing the 2020 presidential election. The assignment of constitutional powers to 
the states is uncommon but not unique to the Electors Clause; several other pro-
visions assign specific powers to states and state governmental institutions.57 Yet 
the political-question doctrine has focused on constitutional assignments to Con-
gress or the President. This essay may therefore help expand the character of the 
political-question doctrine beyond the separation of powers at the federal level 
and offer purchase for analyzing the implications of the political-question doc-
trine in a wider range of constitutional assignments, including those allocating 
power to states. 
 
 
 56. Id. at 40. 
 57. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the 
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“reserving to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers” of the state militias); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2 (“When vacancies happen in 
the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to 
fill such vacancies:  Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make 
temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”). 
